In this paper, I analyze an optimal loan contract between a risk-neutral financial intermediary and a risk-averse household, where the household receives an endowment stream that grows over time, and is unable to commit to the contract. I argue that in this environment, the presence of uncertainty in the household's endowment may improve the household's welfare by relaxing its commitment problem and thus enabling the contract to achieve more efficient intertemporal allocations. I analytically and numerically examine the conditions under which this is true, and show that it requires sufficiently rapid growth of endowment. This result suggests that a slower growth may have a disproportionately large negative effect on welfare, which has potentially important practical implications, for example, for developing countries that face volatile output and rely on external borrowings. * I thank seminar participants at the
Introduction
In economics, uncertainty is typically a source of welfare loss. In a standard Walrasian economy, agents facing uncertainty can, at best, insure through markets all uncertainty and enjoy the same welfare as under no uncertainty. There are some classes of models, however, in which the presence of uncertainty may lead to welfare improvement relative to the certainty case. Among these are models of limited commitment, which I discuss in this paper. In this type of models, feasible allocations must satisfy the participation constraints of the agents who lack the ability to make a commitment, which typically creates efficiency loss compared to the full commitment case. The presence of uncertainty may then improve the welfare of the parties involved, as it may expand the set of feasible allocations by worsening the outside option of agents, hence relaxing their participation constraints. There appears to be little work, however, that explores this idea in detail.
In this paper, I analyze an optimal loan contract between a risk-neutral financial intermediary and a risk-averse household, where the household receives an endowment stream that grows over time, and is unable to commit to the contract. I examine, both analytically and numerically, the conditions under which the presence of uncertainty in the household's endowment improves its welfare compared to the no-uncertainty case, and show that this requires sufficiently rapid growth of endowment. This result suggests that a slower growth may have a disproportionately large negative effect on welfare, which has potentially important practical implications, for example, for developing countries that face volatile output and rely on external borrowings, with the household reinterpreted as a small open economy and the financial intermediary as an international creditor. I further show that welfare improvements over the certainty case are more likely to occur when the endowment process has a large variance and little persistence. Remarkably, the household's welfare is found to be monotonically decreasing in the persistence of endowment.
The model of this paper is a variant of the model of Worrall (1990) , which analyzes an optimal international loan contract when the sovereign borrower can repudiate its debt without legal sanction 1 . The biggest difference is that in my model, the endowment of the sovereign or a household grows over time, which turns out to create critical welfare implications as I describe below. Krueger and Perri (2006) consider a risk-sharing problem between two ex ante identical risk-averse households, and show that a larger idiosyncratic income risk may enable better consumption risk sharing by reducing the households' autarky values. While this mechanism is essentially identical to the one I resort to, there is an important difference in its welfare consequences. In the environment of Krueger and Perri (2006) , which has no trend income growth, the first best outcome is perfect risk sharing. So while a greater uncertainty may locally improve welfare in their model, the presence of uncertainty will not, unlike in my model, generate a strict welfare improvement over an economy with no uncertainty. The key to the original welfare implication in this paper is that a contract serves two roles in my model. The first is efficient risk sharing, or consumption smoothing across different states of nature, which is at the center of attention in most limited commitment literature. If this is the only role performed by a contract, then obviously allocation under no uncertainty is the first best; hence, uncertainty can not improve welfare even if it relaxes the participation constraints. Introduction of growth, however, creates the second role for a contract, namely intertemporal consumption smoothing, or efficient consumption allocation over time. Uncertainty may now improve welfare over the no-uncertainty case, as it may allow a contract to perform better intertemporal consumption smoothing, by reducing incentives for agents to walk away from a contract. This turns out to be more likely under rapid endowment growth, when the household derives high potential benefit from transferring resources from future to present, but has limited capacity to do so because of its inability to commit to stay in the contract once the surplus from the contract becomes negative in future.
There is an extensive literature on the limited commitment environment. Thomas and Worrall (1988) explore optimal wage contracts when neither the firm nor the worker can commit to the contract. Kocherlakota (1996) examines efficient risk sharing between two symmetric risk-averse agents who lack the commitment ability. Kehoe and Levine (1993) and Alvarez and Jermann (2000) show how the optimal allocations in the limited commitment environment can be decentralized as competitive equilibrium allocations.
Model 2.1 Basic Framework
Time is continuous 2 and goes to infinity, and there is a single perishable good in the economy. There are two types of agent. Households are infinitely lived, have a constant 2 The assumption of continuous time is not critical for the main results presented in the paper. The household's welfare, however, may be expressed by a system of equations only under continuous time, which allows computation of the exact time remaining until the participation constraint begins to bind when the state of nature remains unchanged. In a typical environment, where the growth rate of endowment and of optimal consumption both equal zero, this issue does not arise, because if the participation constraint binds in a particular state of nature, it does so at the first date the economy experiences that state.
relative risk aversion (CRRA) period utility over consumption, and discount the future with discount rate ρ > 0, so their discounted lifetime utility is given by
where u(C(t)) = C(t) 1−σ /(1 − σ) (σ > 0, σ = 1). Financial intermediaries are risk-neutral, and unlike households, have access to an external financial market, where they can borrow or lend at constant interest rate r > 0. At date t, a household receives a stochastic endowment Y (t, s(t)), which grows over time at constant rate g ≥ 0. That is,
, where β ∈ [
, 1]. s(t) = {H, L} denotes the state at date t, and a switch from one state to the other occurs according to a Poisson process with arrival rate λ > 0, where the probability of being in each state at t = 0 is equal to the long-run probability, . This is the only source of uncertainty in the model 3 .
A household and a financial intermediary engage in a long-term loan contract before initial state s(0) is realized: the household promises to offer its endowment stream to the financial intermediary, and receives in return a consumption stream. By assumption, the financial intermediary can commit to the contract, but the household cannot. The household can walk away from the contract at any moment, but doing so results in permanent exclusion from the loan market. The loan market is assumed to be competitive. As financial intermediaries are risk neutral, they make zero profits in equilibrium.
In the following, I assume that r > g
and
hold. Since ρ > 0 and σ > 0, (1) and (2) imply
These conditions guarantee that the optimization problems in the model are well-defined.
3 Since a contract of a given household has no effect on the contracts of other households, in this paper it suffices to analyze a contract between a single household and a single financial intermediary. Therefore the cross-sectional distribution of household endowment is irrelevant.
Optimal Contract
In the rest of this paper, an "optimal contract" implies a feasible contract that maximizes the financial intermediary's profit for a given initial promised value (expected discounted lifetime utility) to the household. When the resulting profit equals zero, as is the case in equilibrium, it is called an "optimal zero profit contract". I formulate below, however, the financial intermediary's problem as that of cost minimization; as the financial intermediary's revenue is determined exogenously, it can be separated out to simplify the problem.
Hence, an optimal contract is a stream of consumption {C(s t )}, t = [0, ∞) that solves, for a given V , the following problem:
Q(V 0 ) is the financial intermediary's expected discounted resource cost when it must provide the household the initial promised value V 0 , as indicated by constraint (4). E denotes an unconditional expectation, and E t denotes an expectation conditioned on information at date t. s t denotes history s(τ ) = {H, L}, τ = [0, t), and {C(s τ |s t )}, τ = [t, ∞) denotes the consumption stream specified by {C(s t )}, following history s t . V Aut (t, s(t)), given by
is an autarky value for the household, or the expected discounted utility from consuming its endowment thereafter, at date t and conditional on being in state s(t). Note that due to the assumptions made above on the processes of Y (t, s(t)) and s(t), V Aut (t, s(t)) depends only on s(t), not on the entire history s t . (5) is the participation constraint that demands that the household's continuation value in the contract be at least as large as the household's value of autarky, following all possible history s t .
By symmetry, the expectation of Y (t), before the realization of s(0), equals 1 2 e gt for all t.
Thus, the expected revenue from a contract is R = 1 2(r−g)
, which is independent of parameters β and λ that characterize the endowment process. The expected discounted profit from a contract is hence given by
In an optimal zero profit contract, Π(V 0 ) = 0 or equivalently,
Recursive Optimal Contract
In order to examine the path of consumption in an optimal contract, it is convenient to consider a recursive formulation of the problem. Let us define γ ≡ ρ − (1 − σ)g. From (3), γ > 0. The financial intermediary's recursive problem is then,
where 
∆ is a short time interval that will eventually be taken to zero, and since the changes in state s arrive according to a Poisson process, the probability of a change in state during ∆ is approximately λ∆. o(∆) is an approximation error term such that lim 
and v
Consumption Path
Let θ 1 and θ 2s (s = {s, −s}) respectively denote the Lagrange multipliers for (9) and (10). Setting up the Lagrangian, taking the first order conditions as well as the envelope condition and combining them, it follows that
When the participation constraint does not bind, θ 2s = 0 so that (13) implies
So as we let ∆ → 0,ċ
Thus, in terms of non-detrended consumption C,
when the participation constraint does not bind. The assumption (2) implies that r > µ. When the participation constraint binds,
If this is caused by the switch of state from low to high, consumption experiences a discrete rise. Conversely, when the participation constraint in the same state continues to bind,
because endowment grows at rate g, which must be matched in the contract to satisfy the participation constraint. Figure 1 depicts the path of consumption under g > µ, which turns out to be the more important case in this paper. In the figure, the fine solid curves correspond to the logarithms of C H (t) and C L (t), where C s (t) denotes the consumption, at date t and in state s, that would be assigned by an optimal contract that provides the household V Aut (t, s(t)).
The path of the logarithm of optimal consumption, log C, is denoted by dashed lines when the participation constraint is slack, and by thick solid lines when it is binding. At the point where the path of log C intersects with the curve of log C s (t), the contract provides the household exactly V Aut (t, s(t)). From the figure, we observe that the consumption path is divided into two phases by its intersection with log C H (t): Phase 1, during which the participation constraint is slack regardless of the current state, and Phase 2, during which
at least the participation constraint in the high state binds. Which of the two phases the consumption path starts from depends on the initial promised value to the household, V 0 : when V 0 is relatively large, consumption starts in Phase 1, as in Figure 1 . Figure 2 shows the path of log C under g ≤ µ, which is again divided into two phases: Phase 1', during which the participation constraint may bind, and Phase 2', during which it is slack regardless of the current state. The only situations in which the participation constraints may bind in Phase 1' occur at the beginning of the contract, and at the first date on which the state becomes high. In either case, unlike under g > µ, the participation constraints may bind only instantaneously. For, since the growth rate of optimal consumption (µ) exceeds that of endowment (g), once the participation constraint binds, the values provided in the contract will begin to exceed those in autarky, leaving no reason for the household to walk away from the contract. 3 Uncertainty and Welfare -Analytical Approach
Effect of Growth Rate
I move on to the central question of whether uncertainty can improve welfare. Let V U (β) denote the household's ex ante welfare, or expected discounted lifetime utility before realization of the initial state, provided by an optimal zero profit contract. Also, let V C denote the corresponding welfare when there is no uncertainty, that is,
). The formal definition of welfare-improving uncertainty is as follows.
Definition 1 Uncertainty is welfare improving if
Note that this definition of welfare improvement is for general values of β, rather than for a particular β. The following proposition stipulates a necessary condition for uncertainty to be welfare improving.
Proposition 2 Uncertainty can be welfare improving only when g > µ.
Proof. Suppose g ≤ µ, and first consider the first best consumption path that will be achieved when the household is able to commit to the contract. Obviously, such a path is given by {C(t)}, t = [0, ∞), satisfyinġ
which is independent of β or the actual realizations of state. Now, let us reintroduce the assumption that the household cannot commit to the contract, and first consider the certainty case β = 1 2
. Since the first best consumption path backloads the household's consumption relative to endowment under g ≤ µ, when there is no uncertainty, the household is never tempted to walk away from the contract, hence the first best consumption path can be achieved. On the other hand, when there is uncertainty, or equivalently when β > 1 2
, such a consumption profile may violate the participation constraint at some t, and even if it never does, there can be no welfare improvement over the certainty case, which achieves the first best allocation 4 .
Proposition 2 implies that g > µ is a necessary condition for uncertainty to be welfare improving. Thus, in most of the following analysis, I consider the case in which
holds. The optimal zero profit contract under certainty has a very different form in this case.
Proposition 3 When g > µ and β = 1 2
, the financial intermediary simply returns the endowment stream to the household in an optimal zero profit contract, so V U (β) equals V Aut C , the household's autarky value at date 0 under certainty.
Proof. Consider an optimal contract that provides the household V Aut C . Since g > µ, if the participation constraint is slack, consumption grows slower than endowment in this contract. But since the household's value equals V Aut C at t = 0 by assumption, under such a consumption profile, the household's continuation value from the contract declines below the value of autarky for t > 0. Therefore, the participation constraint always binds for t > 0, which in turn implies that consumption equals endowment ( )e gt for all t. Such a contract obviously provides zero profit to the financial intermediary, so the proposition follows.
Proposition 3 implies that
Intuitively, when g > µ, an optimal contract seeks to front-load consumption relative to endowment. So, consumption is typically relatively high compared to endowment early in the contract, and later becomes relatively low. But the household is tempted to walk away from the contract after the initial high-consumption phase; in order to prevent this, the contract must provide the household at least its autarky value, even during what should be the low-consumption phase. The absence of uncertainty makes it impossible for the financial intermediary to make profits in the low-consumption phase; as a consequence, the high-consumption phase cannot exist under the zero profit condition. When there is uncertainty, however, the risk-sharing role makes the contract valuable to the household even in the low-consumption phase, which allows the financial intermediary to make profits in the late stages of the contract. As a result, some front-loading of consumption can be achieved, which may potentially lead to welfare improvement over the certainty case. I now examine under what additional conditions this actually occurs.
Analytical Approach
Local Welfare Improvement I first employ an analytical approach, which yields a simple sufficient condition for uncertainty to be welfare improving. This approach involves examining how changes in β affects the values of autarky in both states, which I express as v Aut H (β) and v Aut L (β) when I emphasize their dependence on β. I begin with a condition under which uncertainty locally improves welfare.
Proof. From (11) and (12), we obtain
Notice that
, 1], as u (1 − β) ≥ u (β) > 0 and γ > 0. On the other hand,
∂v Aut H ∂β < 0 if and only if β > β 1 , where (λ + γ)u (β 1 ) = λu (1 − β 1 ). This condition yields
Since γ > 0,
, 1). Now, when g > µ and β < 1, endowment grows faster than consumption when the participation constraints do not bind. Thus, eventually consumption becomes too low relative to endowment. Hence, the participation constraints cannot be permanently slack such that relaxing them strictly improves welfare. When
∂v Aut H ∂β < 0, so that an increase in β makes the household's participation constraints in both states less stringent, so V U (β) has to be increasing in β for at least initially increases in β, but begins to decrease in β beyond a certain point, denoted by β 1 . This is because a rise in β has two effects on v Krueger and Perri (2006) resort to this mechanism to show that a rise in household income dispersion may lead to a fall in consumption dispersion.
(23) implies that β 1 is increasing in γ. Since γ = ρ − g(1 − σ), this means that β 1 increases in g if σ > 1, and decreases in g if σ < 1. The intuition is as follows. γ can be interpreted as an effective discount rate for the household. Thus, a larger value for γ implies that values obtained in the future are discounted more heavily, or that the present becomes relatively more important. Now, when σ < 1, the household's utility values are positive, and their absolute values are increasing in consumption. Thus, a larger g increases the absolute values of utility in the future, and makes them more important, which lowers the effective discount rate γ. This reinforces the second effect of β on v Aut H stated above, and results in a fall in β 1 , or equivalently in an expansion of the region of β for which
Conversely, if σ > 1, utility values are negative, and a larger g reduces the absolute values of utility in the future. So in this case, a rise in g increases the effective discount rate, which leads to an opposite implication for β 1 . 
Sufficient Condition for Welfare Improvement
The discussion thus far suggests that, in order to determine whether uncertainty is welfare improving, it suffices to compare
) and V U (1). This comparison delivers a sufficient condition, as summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Uncertainty is welfare improving if
, σ = 1.
Proof. As mentioned above, (i) is a necessary condition for uncertainty to be welfare improving.
(ii) is obtained by comparing the participation constraints under β = 1 2 and β = 1, in both the high and low state. First, observe from (11) and (12) 
, the financial intermediary's problem has less stringent participation constraints under β = 1, so that V C < V U (1). This condition can be written as
When σ > 1, u(0) = −∞ so that (24) is always satisfied. When 0 < σ < 1, (24) becomes
Since λ > 0 and γ > 0, log( (25) is satisfied when σ > 1, and thus this serves as the general expression for the sufficient condition.
It is cautioned that the RHS of (25) is itself a function of σ, as γ = ρ − g(1 − σ). The following corollary illustrates a special case, in which the sufficient condition allows an easier interpretation.
Corollary 6 If r = ρ > g > 0, there exists σ * = σ * (λ, ρ, g) ∈ (0, 1) such that uncertainty is welfare improving if and only if σ ≥ σ * and σ = 1.
Proof. See Appendix. This corollary implies that uncertainty is welfare improving for sufficiently large values of σ. Intuitively, a rise in σ reduces the household's autarky values under uncertainty through an increase in risk aversion, and increases the benefit of consumption front-loading enabled by uncertainty through a reduction in intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES). Both of these outcomes increase the value of uncertainty.
When the sufficient conditions above are satisfied, there exists β 2 ∈ (β 0 , 1) such that V U (β) > V C for all β > β 2 ; β 2 is simply the largest β such that V U (β) = V C , which is guaranteed to exist given V U (1) > V C and the continuity of V U (β). But it is worth emphasizing that (25) is not necessary for uncertainty to be welfare improving. For, even if (24) is not satisfied, v
) always holds, such that relaxation of the participation constraint in the low state may more than offset its tightening in the high state. Thus, sharper predictions on the relation between uncertainty and welfare require numerical analysis, which I turn to in the next section.
First, however, it is worth mentioning how λ, the arrival rate of the endowment shock, affects the household's welfare.
Arrival Rate of Shocks and Welfare
The following proposition illustrates how λ affects the sufficient condition for welfare improvement.
Proposition 7 (1) The RHS of (ii) of the sufficient condition in Proposition 5 is decreasing in λ, and goes to 1 as λ → 0, and to 0 as λ → ∞.
(
, 1] and σ > 0 (σ = 1).
Proof. I omit the proof of 7(1), which is straightforward. For the proof of 7(2), notice from (11) and (12) Intuitively, for a small λ, the value of autarky in the high state is high, because the probability of switching to the low state is low. Thus, for this value to be smaller than the value of autarky under no uncertainty, σ must be large. As λ → 0, this requires σ > 1, which yields u(0) = −∞, hence outweighing the decrease in the switching probability. On the contrary, for a large λ, the value of autarky in the high state is relatively low since there is a high probability of switching to the low state. In the extreme case of λ → ∞, the difference between v Aut H and v Aut L approaches zero, and both become smaller than the autarky value under no uncertainty for all σ > 0, not just for β = 1 but also for all β ∈ ( 1 2 , 1]. So when g > µ, as λ → ∞, the household's welfare under uncertainty always exceeds that under no uncertainty.
The following proposition describes the direct effect of λ on welfare.
Proposition 8 When g > µ, V U (β) is weakly increasing in λ, and is strictly so unless
or σ > 1 and β = 1.
Proof. See Appendix. Proposition 8 implies that when g > µ 5 , V U (β) is increasing in λ, except when β = 1 2 or σ > 1 and β = 1, in which case V U (β) is independent of λ. From (11) and (12), it can be shown that
, which implies that a larger λ relaxes the participation constraint in the high state, and tightens it in the low state. The positive welfare effect of λ indicates that the former effect dominates the latter.
4 Uncertainty and Welfare -Numerical Approach
Numerical Analysis Derivation of Welfare
The numerical analysis requires the derivation of equations, from which we may explicitly compute the household's welfare under an optimal zero profit contract. I defer formal derivations to the appendix, and provide here the intuition instead.
Recall the two phases illustrated in Figure 1 . I first examine the optimal contract in Phase 2, and compute the expected profit of the financial intermediary at the beginning of Phase 2. If this is non-positive, we obtain the equations that define the household's welfare simply from analysis of Phase 2. If this is positive, we need to proceed to analyze what the contract looks like in Phase 1, and to combine the analyses in both phases. 
Effect of Uncertainty on Welfare
The procedure above yields a set of equations that implicitly define the household's welfare, which allows us to perform the numerical analysis. While the following exercises should be considered as numerical examples rather than simulations based on full calibration, I pick some of the parameters, such as the discount rate and the interest rate, such that the time length of 1 can be interpreted as 1 year. , 1), g = 0.02, ρ = 0.04, r = 0.04, λ = 0.05, and σ = 0.5. Figure 5 does the same, but uses σ = 2 instead. For comparison, both figures also plot
) under the same parameters. In both examples, we observe that V U (β) < V C for β close to , and V U (β) > V C for sufficiently large β. Also, the range of β for which V U (β) > V C is wider under σ = 2, which is natural given how, as described above, higher risk aversion and lower IES increase the value of uncertainty.
How Large is the Welfare Gain/Loss ?
To facilitate the quantitative evaluation of the welfare effect of uncertainty, Figure 6 and relative to V C , for the same parameter values as in Figure 4 and Figure 5 . To be precise, the vertical axis corresponds to α expressed as a percentage, where α solves
Figure 6 shows that when σ = 0.5, the welfare effect of uncertainty, either positive or negative, is not so large. Again this is natural, because when σ is small, the household's welfare cost of consumption fluctuation is small. As Figure 7 shows, however, the welfare gain from uncertainty may be fairly large when σ = 2, exceeding 30% of flow consumption in the certainty case, as β approaches 1.
Cost of Slower Growth
Discussions thus far suggest that the difference in growth rates may have a disproportionately large effect on welfare. The next two figures show this explicitly. Figure 8 uses ρ = 0.04, r = 0.04, λ = 0.05, and σ = 2 as in Figure 5 and Figure  7 , and plots V U (β) for g = 0.01 and g = 0.03. Again for comparison, V C , for both parameter combinations, are plotted together. We observe that for large enough values of β, V U (β) > V C for both values of g, but that the welfare gain from uncertainty is much smaller under g = 0.01. In Figure 9 , again to facilitate the evaluation of the magnitude of this effect, I express the difference in welfare in terms of consumption equivalent variations. To be precise, I first compute the welfare gain or loss, relative to V C for g = 0.01 and in terms of consumption equivalent variations, of the other series. I then take the difference of the series corresponding to V U (β) for g = 0.03 and g = 0.01, and plot it along with the series for V C under g = 0.03.
The resulting figure shows how the cost of 2% slower annual growth, converted into the fraction of consumption flows in the certainty case under g = 0.01, is affected by the size of uncertainty. Notice that the cost becomes very large for large values of β, or when the variance of endowment is large 6 . In this example, the cost of 2% lower growth rate, for β close to 1, is about five times as large as that for β = 1 2
, or under no uncertainty. A potential policy implication of these results is that countries or entrepreneurs facing fast growth and volatile output may suffer very large welfare losses from growth slowdown. This is because, under the environment of the model, slow growth has the indirect cost of dampening or even eliminating the positive effect of uncertainty on welfare. Put differently, uncertainty may be a beneficial commitment device under fast growth, but it becomes a nuisance when the growth rate declines, as in a more standard environment.
Arrival Rate of Shocks and Welfare
In Section 3, I showed that the greater the arrival rate of the endowment shock λ, or equivalently the smaller the persistence in the endowment process, the easier it becomes to satisfy the sufficient condition for uncertainty to be welfare improving. I also proved that the household's welfare is strictly increasing in λ except for extreme values of β. Here, I analyze the quantitative impact of λ on the household's welfare. . This implies that the mechanism of welfare improving uncertainty shown in this paper is more appropriate for events such as economic crises or famines that occur infrequently but that entail disastrous outcomes, rather than for normal business cycle fluctuations. But even for β = 0.508, λ = 0.29, ρ = r = 0.04 and σ = 2, it turns out that welfare is greater than under no uncertainty for g greater than approximately 0.03. Therefore, this level of economic fluctuations may still improve welfare in rapidly developing countries.
Welfare Effect in General Equilibrium
I have thus far assumed that the interest rate is exogenously given, as in a small open economy model. A natural question is whether the results presented in this paper would hold in a general equilibrium model in which the interest rate is determined endogenously.
The answer to this question will depend on the model horizon. Note that if the economy is closed, the economy as a whole is unable to transfer resources intertemporally, given the assumption that the endowment is exogenous and nonstorable. Thus, if households are ex ante identical and infinitely lived, the interest rate endogenously adjusts to achieve g = µ, or in other words, to eliminate the gains from intertemporal consumption smoothing. Therefore, uncertainty cannot be welfare improving.
The situation is different for an overlapping generations model, which has room for socially efficient intergenerational transfers. Consequently, there will exist a low interest rate equilibrium in which contracts may achieve some intertemporal consumption smoothing.
So the mechanism through which uncertainty improves welfare would survive qualitatively, although its quantitative effects are likely to be smaller due to interest rate adjustments.
Conclusion
In this paper, I examined the welfare implications of uncertainty in a simple lending contract problem between a risk-neutral financial intermediary and a risk-averse household, when the latter cannot commit to the contract. Through both analytical and numerical analysis, I showed that if the growth rate of household's endowment is sufficiently high, the presence of uncertainty in the household endowment may improve its welfare compared with the no-uncertainty case. This is because in such an environment, uncertainty makes the contract valuable by imparting to it the role of risk-sharing, which in turn helps to achieve better intertemporal consumption smoothing by relaxing the household's commitment problem. I also showed that slower growth may have a disproportionately large effect on welfare, as it undermines the positive effect of uncertainty on welfare. This may have interesting implications on, for example, how developing economies behave at the end of the high-growth "catch-up" phase. Finally, I analyzed how the arrival rate of endowment shocks affects welfare. I found that if the growth rate of household's endowment exceeds a certain threshold, uncertainty always improves welfare as the arrival rate approaches infinity. Moreover, I showed that the household's welfare is in general increasing in the arrival rate, or equivalently decreasing in the persistence, of endowment shocks.
There are several potential extensions and applications of the paper. In terms of theory, the present model assumes CRRA utility for the household. While this assumption makes the analysis fairly tractable, it obscures the respective importance of IES and the degree of risk aversion in the welfare implication. I am considering extending the model by adopting other preferences, for example the Epstein-Zin utility (Epstein and Zin (1989) ), that allow disentanglement of these factors. In terms of application, the model framework may be used to explore the implications of growth in topics to which a limited commitment approach is applied, such as international risk sharing under risk of default, and implicit insurance arrangements in village economies 8 . I leave such applications for future research.
Appendix A: Proofs Proof of Corollary 6
Note that when r = ρ > g > 0, (2) and (19) are satisfied for any σ > 0. Also, as before, (24) is satisfied for all σ > 1. Thus, it suffices to examine when (25) holds under 0 < σ < 1.
. Obviously f (σ) is continuous, and noting that γ = ρ−g(1−σ), f (σ) < 0 as σ → 0 and f (σ) > 0 as σ → 1, so by the intermediate value theorem, there exists at least one σ
) and hence f (σ) > 0, so it must be that σ * is unique and that f (σ) ≥ 0 for all σ ∈ [σ * , 1).
Thus, (24) holds if and only if σ ≥ σ * and σ = 1, which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 8
When β = 1 2
, the endowment is the same in both states, so λ clearly has no effect on V U (β). When σ > 1 and β = 1, (11) and (12) imply v Aut L
= v
Aut H = −∞, so the participation constraints never bind. Therefore the first best allocation can be achieved for any λ > 0, hence λ again has no effect on V U (β).
For the main result, it suffices to prove
To see this, let us write Q(V 0 ) and V U (β) respectively as Q(V 0 , λ) and V U (β, λ), to emphasize their dependence on λ. Then for anyλ > λ > 0,
Using the recursive formulation, Q(V 0 ) can be written as
where q s (v) is defined by (8) , the participation constraint in the low state will not bind unless
Aut H ) must hold since a contract cannot do worse than autarky. So from the first order conditions, the optimal v H and v L = 2V 0 − v H are such that
if the participation constraint in the high state is slack, and
if it is binding. Further, combining the envelope condition with the first order conditions and noting that
The goal of the proof is to show that the RHS of this expression is negative for any
, which is achieved by analyzing the problem given by (8)-(10). Combining the first order conditions with the envelope condition, it follows that when the participation constraints do not bind,
But when g > µ = r−ρ σ
(32) and (33) imply v s < v s , or that the (detrended) promised value falls when the state remains unchanged. Thus the participation constraints in both states begin to bind in finite time.
Let v s andṽ s respectively denote the optimal promised value in state s tomorrow, when the current state is H and L. Then from the envelope condition and the first order conditions,
). It requires separating the following two cases.
This corresponds to the situation in which the consumption path starts from Phase 1 in Figure 1 . In this case, the participation constraint is slack when choosing the initial v H and v L , so that (29) holds, which in turn implies v H =ṽ H and v L =ṽ L . To see this, note that if the participation constraint in state s is slack tomorrow, (29), (34) and (35) 
unless the participation constraint in the high state binds tomorrow. Letting T 1 denote the time until the participation constraint in the high state begins to bind, as ∆ → 0, (37) can be written as
Noting (31), the proof for V 0 ≥Ṽ 0 is complete if we can show that the RHS of (38) is non-positive. This is performed by analyzing the following case.
In this case, the consumption path starts from Phase 2 in Figure 1 . This time v H = v Aut H , and the participation constraint implies that v H =ṽ H = v Aut H as well. The following lemma is an important step for proving the main proposition.
Lemma 9
, and is strictly so 
From (35), (39) and (40),
and a similar computation leads to
This procedure yields
for
But in the RHS of (41), the second line is positive (unless
, in which case it equals zero) due to the convexity of the cost function q L , and is proportional to ∆. On the other hand, the third line goes to 0 faster than ∆ because as ∆ → 0,
Finally, the last line in the RHS of (41) equals
which is proportional to ∆ 2 . So for a small enough ∆ (or equivalently for a large enough N), the third and the last line will be dominated by the second line, which is positive. Therefore,
with strict inequality except for k = N − 1. But then from (31),
with strict inequality except for k = N − 1, where
To prove
, it remains only to show
, and (38) implies
, which completes the proof.
Appendix B: Computation of Welfare Consumption and Welfare in Phase 2
Let us first focus on Phase 2, and define c L ≡ e −gt C L (t) and c H ≡ e −gt C H (t). Since consumption grows at rate g when the participation constraint continues to bind, and since the state switches from high to low with the Poisson arrival rate λ, v Aut H can be expressed as
Similarly,
Here, v L (τ ) denotes the detrended value provided to the household who is in the low state and whose participation constraint is slack, where τ ≥ 0 denotes the time elapsed in Phase 2 since entering the low state most recently. That is, τ = 0 either at the first date in Phase 2, or at later dates when the state switches from high to low, and v L (0) satisfies (36). Define T > 0 such that the participation constraint in the low state begins to bind at
where
Note that the household's detrended consumption remains at c L (equivalently, nondetrended consumption grows at rate g) when the state remains at low, and jumps to provide the value equal to that in autarky when the state switches to high. Since this consumption pattern is exactly the same as that in autarky, it must be that c L = 1 − β. Therefore, e µT c H = e gT c L = e gT (1 − β),
or equivalently e µ(1−σ)T u(c H ) = e g(1−σ)T u(1 − β), 
Using (42), (46) and rearranging,
Using (11) and (12), this can also be written as 1 λ e (λ+γ)T u(β) − η − γ (λ + γ)(λ + η) + 2λ + η λ(λ + η) e (λ+η)T − 1 λ + γ e (λ+γ)T u(1 − β) = 0. (49) This equation implicitly defines T .
Cost to The Financial Intermediary in Phase 2
The next step is to compute the financial intermediary's expected cost at the first date in Phase 2. To simplify notations, let us define q 
which lead to (λ + r − g)q
Moreover, 
where I eliminated q Aut L using (53). Combining (52) and (54) 
At the first date in Phase 2, the probability of being in high or low state is 1 2 each by symmetry; thus, the expected discounted revenue is 1 2(r−g)
. Hence, the zero profit condition indicates that the financial intermediary's expected discounted cost at the first date in Phase 2 is given by 1 2(r − g) if 1 2 (q Using (52) and (55), 
where I used c L = 1 − β and c H = e (g−µ)T (1 − β) to proceed from the third to the fourth line. So the condition 
In Case 1, the household receives v 
In contrast, in Case 2, the household receives v 
Using (11), (12), (42) and (45), 
Note that (60) is obtained by setting T 1 = 0, and (64) is obtained by settingτ = 0.
